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AN AUTHOR'S RIGHT TO RETURN TO A
THEME: PROTECTING ARTISTIC FREEDOM IN
VISUAL, MUSICAL AND LITERARY WORKS
David W. Melville
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the history of art, painters and sculptors have looked to
their past creations as inspiration for current works. Some artists return to
basic themes time and time again. "Winslow Homer's schoolboys, Monet's
facade of Rouen Cathedral, and Bingham's flatboat characters"' all served
as catalysts to expand the boundaries of the visual arts. Many composers,
both classic and modern, continue to write music in one style, employing
the same conventions throughout their careers. Writers often return to well-
known characters in order to invent new stories. Whether the writer is
devising a world of fantasy or spinning the latest detective yarn, characters
from previous stories bring continuity and depth to the plot.
An author who returns to a theme poses a curious problem for
copyright law when he no longer owns rights in the original piece: the
author may be sued for infringing his own work. Since every author is
only a finite source of ideas and expressions, copyright law may undermine
its Constitutional purpose by chilling authorship.2 In addition, variations
on a theme are often used to push the frontiers of an art. The spirit of
experimentation may be stifled if copyright law is too restrictive.
Because separate policy concerns are involved when an author
returns to a theme, this article will draw a distinction between authors who
return to works they created in the past as a source of new ideas and
authors who use the works of others as a source of inspiration. Part II
investigates this distinction in the context of artists who .use the same
* J.D., University of Nebraska College of Law with Highest Distinction, 1994; B.S.,
University of Nebraska-Lincoln with Distinction, 1991. This Article won first prize in the Nathan
Burkan Memorial Competition at the University of Nebraska College of Law. The author would
like to thank Professor Robert Denicola for his insightful comments on earlier drafts.
1. Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., 575 F.2d 62, 66 (3d Cir. 1978).
2. "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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subject matter to design separate visual works,3 and proposes a test for
determining infringement that safeguards experimentation and progress in
the arts.' Part I addresses the problem of composers accused of writing
songs which infringe rights in musical works they devised. Part IV
examines a literary author's right to create sequels with characters that
appear in a work which is no longer owned by the author."
II. VISUAL WORKS
An artist can infringe upon the copyright in a visual work he created
in the same manner as an artist who had no part in shaping the original:
in both cases, the artist is attempting to fashion a new work from the same
subject matter. As a result of the differing policy concerns in each case,
this article proposes that courts use separate tests to determine if infringe-
ment has occurred depending on whether or not the artist created the
original visual work.
A. Copying the Subject Matter of an Original Work
1. Artists Who did not Create the Original
Justice Holmes declared in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co.' that, "[o]thers are free to copy the original. They are not free to copy
the copy."9 One artist cannot preclude another from utilizing a particular
3. See infra notes 7-109 and accompanying text.
4. See infra parts ll.B.2, II.C.
5. See infra notes 139-65 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 166-91 and accompanying text.
7. It is, of course, copyright infringement to reproduce an original work by directly copying
it, regardless of whether the person is the original author who has transferred his ownership rights
in the work, or someone who never had any rights at all. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). See Dodd,
Mead & Co. v. Lilienthal, 514 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (author liable for publishing copies
of his own book in contravention of an exclusive publication contract). Rather, the type of
infringement which this section focuses on occurs in the form of creating another separate work
by copying at least some of the subject matter of the original work. An example of this would
be a photographer taking a picture using the same models and setting as the first photograph,
instead of simply reproducing from the negatives themselves.
8. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
9. Id. at 249. A large body of cases make it clear that a third party may not copy the copy.
See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); cf. MELVILLE B. NIMMER
& DAVID NuMMBR, 2 NlMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.01[C], at 8-18 (1993). "MIhe availability of
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model or subject matter to create a second work. As with most truisms,
Holmes' statement is valid as a general matter, but the proposition is in no
way absolute. It is certainly true that copyright in a photograph or painting
does not give an artist copyright protection in the underlying subject
itselfV 0 But in many circumstances Justice Holmes' aphorism has not
been followed. In those situations, "[o]thers are not 'free to copy the
original' . . . any more than they may copy the copy."'" Subsequent
artists may only use the original subject matter to the extent that they are
not, in effect, simply "copying the copy" by appropriating the first author's
expression in the original work.' Generally, courts apply the idea-
expression dichotomy to visual works, at least metaphorically. The
copyrightable elements of a work include only the artist's particular
expression of the subject. 3 Unprotectable "ideas" include elements such
as color, perspective and positioning of basic geometric shapes. 4
Protectable "expression" lies in the artist's combination and arrangement of
these elements.'
5
such a common source will not immunize the defendant from liability if in fact he copied from
plaintiff and not from the common source.... ." lML However, if the second artist's work was
the result of independent creation then it is not a copy of the first work regardless of the amount
of similarity between them. Id. at 8-17.
It seems that Justice Brandeis had doubts about giving copyright protection to "non-
artistic" photographs in International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). "The mere record of isolated happenings, whether in words or by
photographs not involving artistic skill, are denied such protection." ld. at 254. Although
Brandeis' view has not been followed, "it supports the proposition that the scope of protection
for an ordinary photograph is narrow." David E. Shipley, Conflicts Between Copyright and the
First Amendment After Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 983,
1029 n.302 (1986).
10. Pagano v. Chas. Beseler Co., 234 F. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); Pohl v. Mills, 218 Cal. 641
(1933); see also Jack Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 187, 189 (S.D.N.Y.
1934). In a case involving a human model, one court remarked that the plaintiff could not
copyright the use of the model in another commercial because "they did not create her." Chuck
Blore & Don Richman, Inc. v. 20/20 Advertising Inc., 674 F. Supp. 671, 676 (D. Minn. 1987).
11. 2 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 8.01[C], at 8-20.
12. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th
Cir. 1979); Chuck Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 671; Alt v. Morello, 227 U.S.P.Q. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
13. See Lynne A. Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy, and Post-
Modernism, II CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 19 (1992).
14. PAUL GoLDsTmN, 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 8.2, at 63 (1989).
15. Id. Difficulties in determining exactly when protectible expression has been appropriated
prompted Judge Learned Hand to state:
Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond
copying the "idea," and has borrowed its "expression." Decisions must therefore
inevitably be ad hoc.... No one disputes that the copyright extends beyond a
photographic reproduction of the design, but one cannot say how far an imitator
1994]
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Attempts to circumvent copyright law by making an exact replica of
the original subject matter, instead of simply reproducing the actual
physical depiction, arose as early as the nineteenth century. In Turner v.
Robinson,6 Henry Wallis painted "The Death of Chatterton" which was
placed in the Royal Academy of Art in London in 1856. A few years later,
James Robinson observed the painting on exhibit in Dublin. After viewing
the painting, Robinson studied several biographical accounts of the event
and arranged a pallet, table and box in front of a canvas screen painted by
a scenic artist. Robinson placed a servant on the pallet and took several
stereoscopic photographs which he advertised as "The Life and Death of
Chatterton."' 7 Robinson's photograph copied even the minute details of
the painting's coloring.' The Irish Court of Appeals ruled that the
photograph had been contrived to make a perfect representation of the
painting and "no Court of Justice can admit that an act, illegal in itself, can
be justified by a novel or circuitous mode of effecting it."' 9
An even more unusual situation occurred in Hanfstaengl v. H.R.
Baines & Co.20 In that case, the plaintiff owned the copyright in a series
of German paintings. Several people posed on stage as characters from the
painting in a performance at the Empire Theater in London. The actors
created a real life representation of the German paintings by forming
"living pictures."'" The defendant attended the performance and published
sketches of the living pictures in the Daily Graphic newspaper along with
an account of the performance. The House of Lords held that one work
may be a reproduction of another even though it was not copied directly
must depart from an undeviating reproduction to escape infringement.
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
16. 10 Ir. Jur. 121 (1859), affrd, 10 Ir. Jur. 521 (1860).
17. Id at 125-26.
18. Id. at 144.
19. Turner v. Robinson, 10 Ir. Jur. 510, 521 (1860). Both opinions rely on strained notions
of publication, since at the time there was no statute giving an artist copyright in a painting.
Turner v. Robinson, 10 Ir. Jur. 121, 131 (1859). As a result, the decisions turned on whether the
painting had been published by exhibition, divesting the plaintiff of copyright protection at
common law. Turner v. Robinson, 10 Ir. Jur. 510, 513 (1860).
20. 20 App. Cas. 20 (1894).
21. Id at 22. The plaintiff had acquired the copyright in four pictures which were presented
on stage including: "First Love," "Loves me, loves me not," "Charity," and "Pets." Id. at 25.
Lord Herschell was careful to note that countenances of the persons who posed in the Living
Pictures did not bear a close resemblance to those depicted by the artist. Id
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from the work itself.' Instead of focusing on differences in minor details
or leading features, Lord Shand resolved the infringement issue by
determining whether the second work adopted the essential features and
substance of the original.' However, Lord Watson realized that "a copy,
by an eminent hand, may display merits which the original does not
possess." 24 He recognized that in some circumstances, a talented artist
may create a variation with enough distinctions that it would not infringe
upon the original.
A court may be particularly inclined to find infringement in a case
such as Alt v. Morello,"s where a relatively famous artist used his position
to steal the secrets of a less well-known artist.26 In Alt, Joe Morello was
an established photographer while Howard Alt's career was at its beginning.
Alt had previously been employed by Morello, but started working as an
apprentice in the studio of Frederic Finkelstein. During his association with
Finkelstein, Alt created a photograph of a pencil and a Cross pen framed
against a dark background. The tips of the pen and pencil crossed in the
center of the picture and were lit from below.27 While Alt was working
on his photograph, Morello observed the set up during a visit to the studio
and later saw the finished version in Alt's portfolio. Soon after, Alt
became aware that Morello had produced a markedly similar photograph
and left Finkelstein's studio. Alt began marketing his portfolio to several
advertising agencies, but found little success because numerous art directors
had already received copies of Morello's second photograph. Alt found
22. Hanfstaengl, 20 App. Cas. at 30. Hanfstaengl and Turner clearly indicate that copyright
"protects against unauthorized copying not only in the original medium in which the work was
produced, but also in any other medium as well." I NIMmER, supra note 9, § 2.08[E], at 2-127.
See also Lumiere v. Pathe Exch., 275 F. 428 (2d Cir. 1921).
Hanfstaengl is rather bizarre, because the defendant had no part in setting up or
positioning the subject matter. Hanfstaengl, 20 App. Cas. at 28. Interestingly, Lord Ashbourne
seemed to entertain a freedom of the press argument that the sketches "were intended to represent
what could be seen at the Empire Theater, and were not intended as copies .... ." Id. at 29.
23. Id. at 31. The other Lords each agreed that the sketches were an infringement (with the
exception of Lord Ashbourne), but refused to articulate any sort of test. For example, Lord
Watson remarked:
The possibility of laying down any canon which will afford in every case a
useful test of what constitutes a copy or colourable imitation of the work or its
design is, in my opinion, very doubtful. At all events, it is much easier to arrive
at what does not than to define what does constitute a proper test.
Id. at 26.
24. Id. at 26-27.
25. 227 U.S.P.Q. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
26. Id
27. Id. at 50.
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himself in the unfortunate position of having others believe he had actually
copied Morello's picture.2"
Morello's version contained only slight variations from the original.
Morello merely used a different brand of pen and pencil, slightly varying
the angles at which they intersected. The court had little problem finding
access to the work and substantial similarity.29 "The differences between
the two photographs are so insignificant that 'the ordinary observer, unless
he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and
regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.'"30
In Kisch v. Ammirati & Puris Inc.,3 both the original and subse-
quent photographs were taken at the Village Vanguard, a nightclub in
Manhattan, with the same mural serving as the background. The plaintiff's
black and white picture featured a young woman seated holding a
concertina. In contrast, the defendant's color photograph featured a
musician, John Lurie, seated holding a saxophone with a bottle of lime
juice in the forefront.3" The court denied the defendant's motion for
summary judgment concluding that the mood of the defendant's photograph
was similar enough to the original conception that a rational trier of fact
could find infringement." Kisch, however, marked the high point for
judicial protection of subject matter used in an another original work.
In Edwards v. Ruffner, the court indicated that, even if the
defendant had copied from Edwards, she took no more than unprotectible
ideas in creating her own work. Edwards designed a photograph of a ballet
dancer in the fifth position entitled "Leg Warmers." Aptly enough, the
photograph depicted a dancer's leg covered by torn leg warmer socks from
her feet to slightly above the knee-caps. 35 One of the defendants used a
28. Id. The situation which resulted is similar to reverse confusion in trademark law where
consumers believe that the goods sold by the first user of the trademark are actually those of the
second user. See RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 cmL f (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1990); Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 408 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Colo.
1976), aft'd, 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977).
29. Alt, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 51.
30. Id. at 57 (citing Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d
Cir. 1960)).
31. 657 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
32. Id. at 384. The two photographs are reproduced in ALAN LATMAN ET AL., COPYRIGHT
FOR THE NINETIES 423 (1989).
33. Kisch, 65 F. Supp. at 384. See also Chuck Blore & Don Richman, Inc. v. 20/20
Advertising Inc., 674 F. Supp. 671 (D. Minn. 1987); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1186 (5th Cir. 1979).
34. 623 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
35. Id. at 512.
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photograph entitled "Toe Shoes" on its greeting cards. This picture also
portrayed a ballet dancer in the fifth position wearing leg warmers. As the
court related the facts, the appearance of the leg warmers and ballet shoes
in the second picture were in "stark contrast" with Edwards' depiction. The
photographs were taken at different angles and portrayed the classic fifth
position pose in a noticeably different fashion.3 6 As a result, Edwards
failed to meet the likelihood of success on the merits standard necessary to
obtain a preliminary injunction. The court found that the two photographs
shared only common "ideas," ruling that Edwards could not "preclude
others from depicting a ballet dancer in the classic 'fifth position."""
In summary, Justice Holmes' remark that "[o]thers are free to copy
the original . . . [but] [t]hey are not free to copy the copy'"38 must be
qualified. Subsequent artists are free to copy the original subject matter to
the extent that they are not merely "copying the copy" by appropriating the
first artist's expression.39 Often, however, even significant variation in
positioning, coloring, and use of models will not avoid infringement.4 °
2. Artists Who Created the Original
Artists often return to the subject matter of a work they devised in
the past in order to create a new version highlighting different aspects of
the subject, or using a different perspective to fashion a new expression.
"[T]he very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and
recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea."'
The difficulty in copyright law arises when an artist no longer owns rights
in the original work. If courts simply apply the same tests and principles
to determine whether an original artist has infringed upon his own work as
they do when determining if another artist has infringed upon the work,
copyright law may work against itself to stifle the very authorship it seeks
to foster.
36. L
37. Id at 513. Cf International Biotical Corp. v. Associated Mills, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 511,
514 (N.D. Il. 1964): 'Plaintiffs copyrights cannot monopolize the various poses used in these
photographs since its copyrights can protect only Plaintiff's particular photographic expression of
these poses and not the underlying ideas ....." Id
38. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903).
39. 2 NImMER, supra note 9, § 8.01[D], at 8-20.
40. See, e.g., Kisch v. Ammirati & Purls Inc., 657 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
41. Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J 965, 966 (1990) (emphasis omitted).
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a. State of the Law
Courts have approached the problem of common authorship with
varying degrees of sensitivity and varying results.42 The Second Circuit
first addressed this issue in Gross v. Seligman.43 In Gross, an artist
named Rochlitz posed a nude model for a photograph entitled "Grace of
Youth." Rochlitz assigned the copyright to the plaintiffs and took another
photograph of the same model entitled "Cherry Ripe" two years later.
While the court indicated that "the artist was careful to introduce only
enough differences to argue about," the description of the photographs
indicates that the second version may have contained tenable differences."
For example, the young woman who was sedate in "Grace of Youth" wears
a smile in the second picture and holds a cherry stem between her teeth.
In addition, the backgrounds are different and the contours of the woman's
figure had changed from the passing of the years.45 However, the court
found that because of the similarities in pose, light, and shade, the second
work would "seem to be a copy to the ordinary purchaser who did not have
both photographs before him at the same time.
46
The opinion is disturbing on two counts. First, the court equated the.
facts of this case with those in Turner v. Robinson' and Hanfstaengl v.
H.R. Baines & Co.,48 even though those cases involved indirect copying
by a second artist.49 The court did not recognize a potential difference
when the original author created both works. Second, the standard the
court used to determine substantial similarity is extremely restrictive
regardless of who created the second work. ° An ordinary purchaser
42. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, § 8.2, at 65.
43. 212 F. 930 (2d Cir. 1914).
44. Id. at 931.
45. Id. at 930-31.
46. Id. at 931-32.
47. 10 Ir. Jur. 121 (1859), aff'd, 10 Ir. Jur. 510 (1860). See supra notes 16-19 and
accompanying text.
48. 20 App. Cas. 20 (1894). See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
49. Gross v. Seligman, 212 F.2d 930, 931 (2d Cir. 1914).
50. Id. The court opined that:
the identities are much greater than the differences, and it seems to us that the
artist was careful to introduce only enough differences to argue about, while
undertaking to make what would seem to be a copy to the ordinary purchaser
who did not have both photographs before him at the same time.
Id. See also Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., 230 F. 412 (2d Cir. 1916) (determining that
publication of another photograph of the same model, "At Ease," did not destroy the copyright-
ability of "Grace Of Youth").
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might easily believe that photographs of different trees or even different
babies were copies if not allowed to compare the pictures.5'
While the Gross court may have failed to address the different
concerns involved with original authors, other courts have at least
recognized the problem.52 For example, in Esquire, Inc. v. Varga
Enterprises, the defendant made a series of drawings which were
published as a monthly feature in Esquire magazine. The drawings,
commonly known as "Varga Girls," portrayed women in a state of semi-
nudity that over-emphasized many physical details of the female anatomy.
After Varga's contract ran out, he continued making and selling his
drawings as calendars. The magazine claimed that four of his subsequent
drawings infringed upon some of the pictures he had drawn for them. In
ruling that the new drawings contained a significant number of distinctions
from the old, the court recognized that:
[the] defendant's artistic talent is limited to the portrayal of
the female figure in varying degrees of undress. His success
in this line of endeavor can undoubtedly be attributed to the
remarkable physical characteristics of his finished product,
e.g., the exaggerated torso and the subtly curved but unduly
long leg.... It follows, therefore, that all his future drawings
will bear some similarity to his previous work, whether or not
his past creations are before him at the time he is painting.54
Although the court recognized that different concerns might be involved,
it did not articulate a standard of infringement but instead simply found that
the distinctions were sufficient to avoid infringement.55
Currently, the Third Circuit has provided the strongest protection of
an artist's right to return to a theme. In Franklin Mint Corp. v. National
Wildlife Art Exchange,5" Albert Gilbert, a nationally recognized wildlife
artist, agreed to paint a watercolor of cardinals for the National Wildlife Art
51. The test used by the court is more analogous to consumer confusion in trademark than
substantial similarity. See REsTATEMETr OF THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPErmON § 20 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1990) ("One is subject to liability for infringement of another's trademark... [if]
the actor uses a designation that is likely to cause confusion."). The standard relies on confusion
of the consumer in the marketplace and not on a side-by-side comparison of the marks.
52. Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992); Franklin Mint
Corp v. National Wildlife Art Exch., 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978); Gentieu v. John Muller & Co.,
712 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Esquire v. Varga Enters., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. m.
1948), affd in part, rev'd in part, 185 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1950).
53. 81 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. 11. 1948), afrd in part, rev'd in part, 185 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1950).
54. Id. at 307-08.
55. Id. at 308.
56. 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978).
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Exchange. Gilbert used source material such as color slides, photographs,
sketches, and two stuffed cardinal specimens to fashion "Cardinals on
Apple Blossom.""7 A few years later, Gilbert painted a watercolor for
Franklin Mint. He used essentially the same collection of source material
with the addition of a few more slides and sketches to compose "The
Cardinal.58 The Third Circuit noted conventional limits in ornithological
art, such as minute attention to detail of the plumage and stance of the bird,
which tend to restrict the novelty of a depiction. "[Tihe fact that the same
subject matter may be present in two paintings does not prove copying or
infringement. Indeed, an artist is free to consult the same source for
another original painting."59
The Franklin Mint Court recognized that the law must grant artists
the freedom to utilize basic subject matter more than once.60 The court
equated the right to create "'variations on a theme' ... as another way of
saying that an 'idea' may not be copyrighted and only its 'expression' may
be protected."61  While the court's formulation is seductive, it misses the
heart of the problem. By recasting the scenario as another version of idea
and expression, the. court's phrasing is applicable to all authors, whether
they created the original work or not.
b. Policy Perspectives and Artistic Freedom
Since separate concerns are involved when an author returns to a
theme, the law should recognize a distinction between the original artist and
subsequent artists. As a matter of policy, an artist who created the first
work should be allowed to cut closer to the expression contained in the
original without infringing upon the copyright.
1. Personality Traits
Each artist has his or her individual style of portraying a subject-a
unique way of expressing an idea. "The copy is the personal reaction of
an individual upon nature. Personality always contains something unique.
It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of
57. Id. at 63.
58. Id.
59. 1L at 65 (citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903)).
60. Franklin Mint, 575 F.2d at 66.
61. l
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art has in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone."62  While
the touch and stroke of an artisan's brush clearly leaves traces of the human
who painted them, photographs also contain elements of personality
embodied in the selection of the background, angle, timing, shading and
lighting used to shape the picture.63 Judge Hand observed that "no
photograph, however simple, can be unaffected by the personal influence
of the author, and no two will be absolutely alike."'
Just as every artist is unique, every artist is also a finite source.6'
There are only a limited number of ways a single personality will tend to
express itself. As a result, an artist's expression will naturally tend to fall
into demarcated patterns.' As one commentator noted, "[b]ecause both
the memory and the inventive powers of even the most brilliantly creative
mind are limited, some degree of repetition within the works of a single
author is inevitable." 67
If an artist's innate mode of expression falls within natural bounds,
each work he or she portrays will be composed of the same set of
characteristics. It is the repetitive nature of expression that allows an artist
to form an "identity." When the artist returns to the same subject, separate
depictions will appear to be similar due to the inherent predilections of the
artist. As one court noted, "[i]f Cezanne painted two pictures of Mont. St.
Victoire, we should expect them to look more alike than if Matisse had
painted the second, even if Cezanne painted the second painting from life
rather than from the first painting.
6 1
62. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
63. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, Ill U.S. 53 (1884); Rogers v. Koons, 960
F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. CL 365 (1992); Chuck Blore & Don Richman,
Inc. v. 20/20 Advertising Inc., 674 F. Supp. 671, 677 (D. Minn. 1987); Kisch v. Ammirati &
Purs, Inc. 657 F. Supp. 380, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub.
Co., 274 F. 932, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581
(1922); 1 Nimmer, supra note 9, § 2.08[E] at 2-126.
64. Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 274 F. 932, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
65. Consistency is what makes both personalities and artists recognizable, cf. Esquire v. Varga
Enters. Inc., 81 F. Supp. 306, 307-08 (N.D. Il. 1948).
66. See Warner Bros. v. CBS, 216 F.2d. 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971
(1954) ("The characters of an author's imagination and the art of his descriptive talent, like a
painter's or like a person with his penmanship, are always limited and always fall into limited
patterns.") Id.
67. Laurie Steams, Copy Wrong: Plagiarism, Process, Property, and the Law, 80 CAL. L.
REv. 513, 543-44 (1992). Stearns made this statement in the context of self-plagiarism which
"occurs when a work echoes an earlier work by the same author." Id. at 543. She continues, "It
becomes objectionable only when it results from laziness or the desire to mislead." Id. at 544.
68. Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1992).
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Thus, if the same methods of determining infringement are applied,
the law will be unjustifiably harsh on the artist who conceived the first
work since that artist naturally leans toward his unique manner of
expression. The artist must avoid at least some of the essential characteris-
tics in his expression to avoid infringement. The odd result is that the first
artist will be more constrained in his depiction of the subject than another
artist who can employ the entire breadth of her own peculiar style. In
essence, the original author is being penalized for having breathed life into
the work.
2. Depletion of Subject Matter
Using the same standard of infringement for all artists may have a
disproportionate effect on the number of original authors willing to risk
litigation to depict an old subject. Even if a court applies the same
standard with tacit leniency," an artist's fear and uncertainty about the
prospects of an infringement action may deter him from generating a work
which might invite a lawsuit."0 The chilling effect is disproportionate
because there is every reason to expect that two works by the same artist
are more likely to look alike than if another artist devised the second. 1
Applying the typical standard of infringement may also have a tendency to
punish specialists. In order to develop a specialty, an artist will naturally
create several versions of the same general subject matter, such as paintings
of cardinals.72 Unless a court is aware of the special need of artists to
return to a theme, the law may inhibit the ability of the specialist to refine
his craft in a way he otherwise might.73
69. Although one cannot be certain, the Third Circuit, for example, may have "masked" their
decision in Franklin Mint by applying the "copying" standard less stringently to an artist accused
of infringing his own work by finding that copyright in the original was "weak." 575 F.2d 62,
65 (1978). See generally Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Decision Making: The
Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 719 (1987).
The problem, of course, is that while the court may have been applying the test less
rigorously, it gives other artists nothing that can be used to measure their own conduct and thus
creates uncertainty. That uncertainty can be as much of a chill as simply using the same yardstick
to determine infringement as is used for other artists.
70. This fear is especially valid in light of the Copyright Act's provision for injunctions,
statutory damages without showing injury, and attorney's fees. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-11 (1988).
71. Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco, 969 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1992).
72. See Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978);
Esquire, Inc. v. Varga Enters., 81 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. III. 1948).
73. See Franklin Mint, 575 F.2d at 66-67.
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Rather than precluding artists from revisiting old ideas or forcing them
to alter the very process by which they create, copyright law should treat
the creation of subsequent works by the same artist as distinct. The
original artist requires more leeway in expressing the idea because his
personal imprimatur is embodied in his expression. In order to allow
access to the idea, the first artist must have a limited degree of access to
that expression.74 Otherwise, the chilling effect may prevent artists from
returning to past subject matter altogether.
3. Experimentation
Artists commonly use a single subject as a vehicle to experiment
with elements of style and technique. For example, Claude Monet would
often use a single subject or set of subjects to create a "series" of works. 5
When word got out that Monet was devising a new series of paintings,
patrons would offer to purchase a piece sight unseen, sometimes even
before he had begun to paint.76 If an art connoisseur was successful in
purchasing the first painting in the series along with its copyright, current
law would likely afford the first purchaser a colorable claim of infringe-
ment against Monet for the subsequent works.77
The threat of litigation by the owner of a copyrighted work may have
the unfortunate effect of deterring experimentation by artists, even if the
suit is ultimately unsuccessful. Monet himself used his series of paintings
based on a single subject as a catalyst for experimentation." In painting
over forty pictures of the Rouen Cathedral, the facade "is observed from the
74. For a discussion of the merger doctrine in Franklin Mint see HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THm
LAw OF COPYRIGHT § 14.03(1)(1), at 14-51 (1993).
75. BERNARD MYERS, METHODS OF THE MASTERS - MONET 88 (1990).
76. Id. at 102.
77. The Franklin Mint court indicated that "(a] painter like Monet when dwelling upon
impressions created by light on the facade of the Rouen Cathedral is apt to create a work which
can make infringement attempts difficult." 575 F.2d 62, 65 (1978). Although the court's
statement may have been clouded by the pre-eminence of the artist in question (considering its
decision to term the copyright in the painting of the cardinals as "weak"), this court may have
actually so decided if faced with the question. However, other courts applying the typical
standard of infringement would probably at least struggle with Monet's subsequent paintings.
Compare Gross v. Seligman, 212 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1914) (changes in the emotional expression
of the model and background were not enough to avoid infringement) with Kisch v. Ammirati &
Puris Inc., 657 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (changing the instrument and the model did not
entitle the defendant to summary judgment).
78. HORST DE LA CROIX & RICHARD G. TANSEY II, GARDNER'S ART THROUGH THE AGES
855 (8th ed. 1986).
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same point of view, but at different times of day and under various climatic
and atmospheric conditions. Monet, with a scientific precision, gives us an
unparalleled and unexcelled record of the passing of time as seen in the
movement of light over identical forms."79 Monet described his work by
commenting, "I was trying to do the impossible... to paint light itself."'
While artists certainly are free to experiment with techniques using
different subjects, a series of works centered around a single subject is
particularly conducive to pushing the boundaries of an art. The use of a
single subject provides the artist with an excellent opportunity to compare
the use of different methods and techniques. The visual artist is able to
assess how well a particular technique or perspective worked far better than
if he could only compare the results with different subjects or models. As
an example, Monet chose the grain stacks as an apt subject to generate a
series of over thirty works because they were so unpromising and banal.
The grain stacks' unremarklable appearance insured that nothing would
distract from his experiment in color and shade."' Monet was able to focus
solely on the portrayal of the subject rather than having to bend the
techniques he was experimenting with in order to adjust to a new sub-
ject.
82
As can be seen, allowing artists to return to prior subject matter
provides an excellent vehicle to challenge the boundaries of conventional
perspectives and technique. Thus, in order to promote experimentation and
advance progress in the arts, copyright law should be interpreted in a
manner that grants the first artist easier access to the subject.
79. Id at 855-56.
80. MYERS, supra note 75, at 92.
81. Id. Monet told the Due de Trevise about the beginnings of the grain stack series of
paintings:
I first of all believed that two canvases would do, one for grey weather and one
for the sun. One day I saw that the light had changed. I asked my step-daughter
to fetch another canvas, then another, still another. I worked on each one only
when I had my effect .... The sun sets so fast that I cannot follow it. I work
so slowly that I am desperate ... the more I continue, the more I see ....
More than ever I am dissatisfied with things that come easily, in one stroke.
I&a t 90.
82. Monet used the single subject matter to experiment with the juxtaposition of colors on the
canvas using short, choppy brush strokes. See DE LA CROIX & TANSEY, supra note 78, at 855.
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4. Public Benefits
Courts should strive to define a standard of infringement that furthers
the constitutional purpose of copyright law by encouraging authorship.
8 3
In this situation, the artist has sold his rights in a work he created to a third
party buyer and now wishes to use the subject matter of that work to create
a new version which would enrich society. By furnishing incentives,
society receives a greater quantity and quality of artistic works. However,
in this instance, the person who holds the copyright is not someone who
creates. Rather, the third party buyer may be attempting to restrain the
artist from using a prior subject matter it the expense of society. Copyright
law should not give the buyer of a work a benefit that stifles the source of
the bargain.
The artist is in a peculiar position with regard to exploiting the
incentive system. If the artist holds the copyright in the original, he is free
to experiment as much as he wants. However, in order to exploit the work
he must sell it to a third party." If the original artist does not have
enough room to experiment with the subject matter, the incentive system
conflicts with itself. The artist is forced to either relinquish much of his
freedom to experiment in order to reap the benefits of the incentive system,
thus slowing progress in the arts, or the artist will not be able to exploit the
work, resulting in less incentive to create. Often, the interest in protecting
buyers of copyrighted works runs parallel to promoting authorship-the
buyer provides a viable market, which creates the economic incentive. In
this instance, however, corralling the spirit of creation by withdrawing
subjects and styles from which an individual can draw protects the buyer
at the expense of stifling authorship. As a result, a standard of infringe-
ment permitting an original author to cut closer to the original expression
is essential.
83. See Litman, supra note 41, at 969; Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
84. A second artist who also wishes to use the subject matter never conceived of the original
work and, therefore, has less claim to the amount of room he should be given to experiment.
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B. The Appropriate Standard for Determining Infringement
1. Standard Infringement Tests
a. Copying
In order to prove infringement of a visual work, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant copied the work and that the copying
constituted improper appropriation. The first element of infringement
signifies that the defendant used the copyrighted work as a model or even
for inspiration in creating the second work. 6 In general, the plaintiff must
either introduce direct evidence of copying, such as an admission by the
defendant, or rely on circumstantial evidence.87 Proof of copying by
circumstantial evidence requires a showing that the defendant had access
to the copyrighted work and that there is substantial similarity between the
works of a degree that negates any inference of independent creation. 8
Once copying has been shown, the court will assume any similarities in
protectible expression are a result of the copying.
When an author returns to a theme, similarities between the works
alone are not indicative of copying. 9 An artist may not have the details
of the past expression in mind when recreating an idea. For example, if an
artist sold a picture of the Golden Gate Bridge painted from a hill in San
Francisco, and then returned a few years later to erect his easel on the same
spot, he may simply prefer the hues the sun casts on the bay from this
vantage point. It does not necessarily follow that merely because the artist
is revisiting an idea, he will recall the details of the prior expression. In
Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp.,9" the Seventh Circuit remand-
ed an infringement claim against a photographer who created separate
pictures of the same product for a catalog advertisement. The court found
85. 3 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 13.01[B], at 13-8, 13-9. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d
464 (2d Cir. 1946); Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1358 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
86. 3 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 13.01[B], at 13-8.
87. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
88. 3 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 13.02[A], at 13-16; Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.
1946); De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 862 (1945);
Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 245 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affid 360 F.2d 928 (2d Cir.
1966).
89. However, "[a] virtually conclusive inference of access can also be drawn from the
evidence that the same individual or individuals who created plaintiff's copyrighted work also
created defendant's work." 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, § 7.2.1, at 10.
90. 969 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).
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the evidence was not clear on the issue of whether the photographer "had
been copying himself, rather than hitting independently on the same
solution to the same rather narrow problem of layout .... "9'
In a case involving common authorship, similarities between the
works do not support an inference that the artist copied the protectible
expression. Although even unconscious copying may form a basis for
infringement when a different artist has access to a work,' substantial
similarity tends to negate any inference of independent creation. When an
artist returns to a theme, however, there is every reason to expect that two
works created by the same author will appear similar even if they were both
the result of independent creation. 93 For instance, in Franklin Mint, the
Third Circuit found that an artist did not "copy" his first effort by painting
a second water color of a cardinal.94 The panel upheld the lower court's
ruling that the "similarity between the works necessarily reflected the
common theme or subject and each painting was a separate artistic
effort.""5
In some cases, it may be that the defendant addressed the subject
with the details of the first expression firmly in mind. If so, the court must
determine if the copying by the defendant in creating the variation went too
far.96 However, in other cases, the artist may have simply recreated the
idea with only the common theme in mind. In the latter case, no matter
how closely the works resemble each other, the similarities in expression
may only be a result of the artist's inherent personality traits.97 The
second work cannot be an infringement since it is the result of independent
creation.9" This determination is a question of fact that the judge or jury
must weigh and decide.
b. Substantial Similarity
Once copying has been established, courts use various subtests to
determine if the copying amounted to improper appropriation.99 Each
91. id at 414.
92. Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
93. Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1992); Esquire,
Inc. v. Varga Enters., 81 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. I1. 1948).
94. Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Exch., 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978).
95. Id. at 66.
96. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
98. See 2 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 8.0l[C], at 8-20.
99. 2 GoLDSIN, supra note 14, at § 8.2.
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subtest focuses on whether the second work is substantially similar to the
first. t While these tests may arguably achieve the proper balance in a
typical infringement action, they fail to account for the special concerns
involved when an artist returns to a theme.
The objective observer or audience test requires the finder of fact to
determine "whether an average lay observer would 'recognize the alleged
copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work."" 0 ' Many
courts apply the test to visual works by removing the unprotectible "ideas"
from their analysis and instead comparing the remaining protectible
expression with that of the second work.0 2 The Third Circuit seems to
have favored this approach in Franklin Mint."3 Often, courts will apply
a variation of the audience test proposed by Learned Hand. t' According
to this approach, the court determines whether "the ordinary observer,
unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook
them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same."'"5  Although the
audience test and its variations may be helpful in the standard infringement
case, application of the test in this context becomes problematic. By
ignoring disparities between works, the court focuses solely on the parts of
the expression that contain the artist's innate personality traits. These
elements will naturally tend to look alike since the same artist created both
works. In the process, the analysis downplays whatever new ideas and
perspectives the artist introduced into the work. Thus, the audience test
increases the likelihood that the trier of fact will find that the second work
is an infringement, posing a significant threat to an artist who wishes to
reuse a basic idea. t°6
100. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 13.03[A], at 13-27.
101. Kisch v. Ammirati & Purs Inc., 657 F. Supp. 380, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (quoting
American Greetings Corp. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 607, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
102. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, § 8.2, at 64; see, e.g., Gentieu v. John Muller & Co., 712
F. Supp. 740 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
103. 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978).
104. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, § 8.2, at 64.
105. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
106. The Ninth Circuit's bifurcated test for infringement articulated in Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977), puts a different spin
on the Arnstein doctrine. The issue is resolved by focusing on the "extrinsic" or general similarity
of the ideas of the works where "analytic dissection and expert testimony are appropriate." 562
F.2d at 1165. The second step or the "intrinsic test" depends "on the response of the ordinary
reasonable person." Id. See also Shaw v. Linheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990) (characterizing
Sid & Marty Krofft as a subjective and objective test).
While the Sid & Mary Kroffi test has not been followed outside the Ninth Circuit, the
test is particularly inappropriate in this situation since its effect has been to "greatly... contract
the role of the court, at least in its powers to rule for the defendant as a matter of law."
PROTECTING ARTISTIC FREEDOM
Some courts in typical infringement actions have couched their
decisions in terms of the "total concept and feel" of the works. 7
However, this approach has been soundly criticized:
[T]he touchstone of "total concept and feel" threatens to
subvert the very essence of copyright, namely the protection
of original expression. "Concepts" are statutorily ineligible for
copyright protection; for courts to advert to a work's concept
as the essence of its protectible character seems ill-advised in
the extreme. Further, the addition of "feel" to the judicial
inquiry, being a wholly amorphous referent, merely invites an
abdication of analysis.'
This approach is especially dangerous in a case involving common
authorship."° In order to incorporate subjects which have been portrayed
in the past, the artist must inevitably use some of the same ideas and
concepts. In addition, an artist's expression is likely to retain the same
"feel" regardless of the subject or emotion which is being portrayed. If the
"total concept and feel" approach is consistently applied, the ability of
artists to experiment will be severely restrained.
2. Proposed Test for Unlawful Appropriation
In order to protect an artist's freedom to return to a theme, this
Article proposes a separate test to determine whether a visual artist has
infringed upon the copyright in a work he no longer owns. The purpose
is to encourage, or at least permit, artists to return to a basic subject in
order to fashion new works while preventing the artist from merely
appropriating the value of the previous work. As a result, the test focuses
on what the artist has added to enhance the work so that it will not be
characterized as an infringement simply because the same personality traits
manifest themselves in both works.
3 NmMSR, supra note 9, § 13.03[EJ, at 13-100. If an artist fears that the Sid & Marty Krofft test
might be applied, the artist will be more likely to err on the side of caution by declining to
experiment with old subject matter rather than face the uncertainty of a jury with the diminished
hope of dismissing the case at the outset on summary judgment.
107. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, § 8.2, at 64. See, e.g., Malden Mills, Inc. v. Regency
Mills, Inc., 626 F.2d 1112, 1113 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The two designs are of such likeness with
regard to subject matter, style of representation, shading, composition, relative size and placement
of components, and mood as to obviously [be] substantially similar.").
108. 3 NIMImR, supra note 9, § 13.03[A], at 13-40.
109. None of the cases in which an artist is accused of infringing the copyright of a work that
he created explicitly uses the "total concept and feel" test.
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To decide whether a visual artist who no longer owns the copyright
in a work has unlawfully appropriated the original expression, the trier of
fact should determine whether an objective observer would view the second
work as containing enough dissimilarities to create a different aesthetic
effect. In other words, the inquiry focuses on whether the artist introduced
enough differences in the expression to allow a lay observer to view the
second work as a separate artistic effort.
The analysis should be qualitative in nature rather than simply
counting the number of differences the artist introduced. It may be possible
that a single change at the core of the expression would be sufficient to
allow a trier of fact to view the second work as a separate artistic
effort."0 For example, if the photographs in Kisch v. Ammirati & Puris,
Inc."' had both been created by the same artist, instead of separate artists,
under the proposed test a jury could easily find that the second work
constituted a new artistic effort, as a matter of fact."' In that case, the
first photograph was a black and white picture of an unidentified woman
holding a concertina in front of a mural. The second photograph depicted,
in color, a famous male musician in front of the same mural holding a
saxophone with a bottle of lime juice in the foreground."' Switching
models and instruments, in this instance, seems to alter the perspective in
a way which arguably changes the aesthetic effect. Applying the standard
outlined above, if the same artist created both works, enough differences
were introduced to view the second picture as a separate work."
4
Since infringement standards in copyright law generally focus on the
similarities between works, a standard emphasizing dissimilarities between
110. But see Esquire, Inc. v. Varga Enters., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 306, 309 (N.D. Ill. 1948)
(indicating that "quite possibly no single item of distinction would, in itself, render a particular
painting free of infringement .... ").
111. 657 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
112. In Kisch, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment ruling that "a
rational trier of fact could find sufficient similarities to prove 'copying."' Mi at 384 (citations
omitted).
113. Id
114. Notice that on the facts of Alt v. Morello, 227 U.S.P.Q. 49, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), even
if the same artist created both photographs, the second work would be very likely be characterized
as an infringement no matter which test was applied. In that case, Morello simply "changed the
brand (name] of [the] pen and pencil and slightly altered their angle from each other ... ." Id.
at 51. Minor variations of this type are unlikely to be viewed as creating enough of a difference
in the aesthetic appeal as to qualify as a separate artistic effort.
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works can be viewed as an antithesis to the customary test."5 However,
in some circumstances "a defendant may legitimately avoid infringement
by intentionally making sufficient changes in a work that would otherwise
be regarded as substantially similar to plaintiff's."'" 6  Considering the
special concerns in this narrow area of copyright, a test that will adequately
maintain the freedom of artists to return to a theme, yet preserve the value
of the original work, can be justified.
In fact, when an artist was accused of infringing upon his own work
in Esquire, Inc. v. Varga Enterprises,"' the court focused almost
exclusively on the disparities between the clothing and hair of the women
in Vargas' drawings while recognizing that the similarities in the exagger-
ated torsos and unduly long legs were due to the fact that "all his future
drawings will bear some similarity to his previous work, whether or not his
past creations are before him at the time he is painting.""' The court
was sensitive to the concern that many of the similarities" 9 were attribut-
able to the personal characteristics of the artist and concentrated on whether
"all of the distinguishing elements, considered in the aggregate, undeniably
constitute a new creative work of art."'"0
Focusing on dissimilarities rather than similarities allows the finder
of fact to observe the differences and recognize them as an attempt to refine
or broaden the work's appeal by incorporating new techniques or perspec-
tives. The differences must add to the new work so that it does not merely
exploit the value of the original. If the dissimilarities were ignored in this
context, the finder of fact would weigh only those segments of the
expression that contain the artist's innate personality traits embodied in both
works. However, if the disparities were given adequate weight, the finder
of fact could concentrate on the essential question: whether or not the
artist was successful in shedding new light on an old subject. Creating a
115. See 2 NIMAER, supra note 9, § 13.03[B], at 13-55. ("It is entirely immaterial that in
many respects plaintiff's and defendant's works are dissimilar if in other respects similarity as to
a substantial element of plaintiff's work can be shown.") See also Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) ("[Mo plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing
how much of his work he did not pirate.").
116. 2 NiMbMR, supra note 9, § 13.03[B], at 13-58; cf. Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., 230
F. 412, 413 (2d Cir. 1916) ("Rochlitz was entirely successful in what he started out to do, and
that he did make two clearly distinguishable and independent poses of the model, each one a
separate piece of artistic copyright, each capable of statutory copyright.").
117. 81 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
118. id. at 307-08.
119. Id. at 309.
120. Id. at 307-09.
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separate test for infringement will safeguard the freedom to experiment
without the fear of liability stifling advancement in the arts.
C. Application of the Proposed Test
The medium, style, and type of subject an artist portrays can create
particularly perplexing problems in determining infringement. This section
will illustrate how the proposed test can be applied when the artist depicts
an object found in nature or uses photography to shape the visual image.
In general, the more accurate the portrayal, the less protection the work is
likely to enjoy.' Therefore, when common authorship is involved, an
artist may also be more likely to infringe upon the prior work since the
subject and medium allow less opportunity for variation of expression.1
As a result, a standard of infringement which focuses on the dissimilarities
between two works may be especially useful in this situation.
1. Subjects Found in Nature
A work depicting a subject found in nature will often receive less
protection from infringement.'2 For instance, the Franklin Mint court
found that the copyright in a painting of a cardinal was "weak" due to the
nature of the subject matter. 24 The latitude for novelty in creating a
work may be limited by the need to accurately portray the subject.l '
121. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971); Gentieu
v. John Muller & Co., 712 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Streeter v. Rolfe, 491 F. Supp. 416
(W.D. La. 1980).
122. See, e.g., Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930 (2d Cir. 1914).
123. See Streeter, 491 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. La. 1980). In Streeter, the court faced the question
of infringement in the context of two turkey decoys. Both decoys attempted to represent the
likeness of a creature found in nature. The court noted that the margin for difference in the
representation of the head, neck, and body of a turkey was small. L at 421. As a result, the
court purported to limit protection of the plaintiff's decoy to an exact copy of its likeness. See
also Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kapakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding no
substantial similarity in a jeweled bee pin).
124. Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978).
125. Id. at 65-66. See also Streeter, 491 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. La. 1980). One commentator
has suggested that others are free to copy an original subject found in nature, such as the Eiffel
Tower or the Brooklyn Bridge, even if it resembles the first work, but others are not free to copy
the original if it was conceived of and posed by the first photographer. Robert A. Gorman,
Copyright Protection For The Collection And Representation Of Facts, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1569,
1598 (1963). See also Joan Infarinto, Copyright Protection for Short-Lived Works Of Art, 51
FORDHAM L. Rnv. 90, 124(1982). The theory springs from a notion that subjects found in nature
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This problem can be particularly acute when the subject is not manipulated
or positioned by the artist. 6 Even though a work depicting a subject in
nature usually receives less protection, the original artist is more likely to
infringe upon the past work because of the limited number of ways a
subject can be portrayed while still remaining identifiable. This problem
is illustrated by portrayals of the unclothed human form.
When a fully or even partially clothed human model is depicted in
a visual work, the artist is able to vary the position and style of the fabric
to foster a new image. 27 However, a nude model provides less opportu-
which have not been arranged by the artist are equivalent to unprotectible "facts," while posing
a model such as the young women in Gross v. Seligman qualifies as "a creative product of the
artist's mind." However, this distinction cannot withstand careful scrutiny. While the
photographer does not pose or manipulate the Eiffel Tower itself, the artist does arrange the
structure in the fashion which he desires. By doing so, he has arranged the photograph of the
tower much like the artist in Gross arranged the photograph of the young woman. The
photographer has constructed the angles, timing, lighting and background to position the subject
as raw material in order to create a product of his own mind.
126. Professor Goldstein suggested the problem of a photographer who takes a picture of the
moonrise over Hernandez, New Mexico and a later photographer returns to take another from the
same spot. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, § 2.11.1, at 154. The second photographer studies the
precise date, time, and camera angle used in the first work. However, Goldstein discusses the
problem in terms of the amount of originality required in order to receive copyright protection.
Goldstein's position is that "Courts will withhold copyright from the second photographer to the
extent that it duplicates the original since the public has gained nothing from the second effort
that it has not already enjoyed from the first." Ld. at 155.
Contrary to comments published in a discussion in David 0. Carson, Copyright Protection
for Factual Compliations After Feist: A Practitioner's View, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 1007, 1009
(1992), Goldstein does not discuss the "Moonrise over Hemandez" problem in terms of
infringement. For example, one person states:
[What I still think he says is if you authors go shoot that picture, you cannot get
a copyright; it is not original what you did, but that is not an infringement of
Ansel Adams' picture because you did not make a copy. What you really did
was copy his idea which is not protected.
Id. at 1013. While the discussion contains an interesting view of infringement, the proposition
is contrary to the case law and certainly not what Professor Goldstein stated. In fact, his view
seems to be exactly opposite considering another comment in his treatise discussing compilations.
"If a copyrighted painting or photograph were involved, and the defendant set out to paint the
same scene or to photograph the same model from the same vantage or in the same pose
employed by the plaintiff, a court might find that defendant's work infringed plaintiff's
copyright." 2 GOLDsTEIN, supra note 14, at § 8.4.1, at 103.
127. See Chuck Blore & Don Richman, Inc. v. 20/20 Advertising, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 671,674
(D. Minn. 1987) (model depicted in rapid edit television advertisement composed of several
frames each with different clothes and jewelry). See also Esquire, Inc. v. Varga Enters., 81 F.
Supp. 306 (N.D. l. 1948). "Although it is certainly not decisive, it should be noted for the
record that the articles of 'clothing' (this term is used euphemistically, for said articles are about
as concealing as the ordinary window pane) vary from picture to picture." Id. at 308.
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nity to devise sufficient variances between works.'2 In a case such as
Gross v. Seligman,"2 9 if the photographer wishes to retain the model's
original pose, there is little else to change besides the background and her
expression."' However, in Gross, the changes in the contours of the
model's body and the addition of the cherry stem between her teeth were
unsuccessful in shifting the exterior appearance of the model to a degree
sufficient to avoid infringement.' While an artist can change the angles
and lighting to arrange the pictures, there are fewer external factors an artist
can manipulate.
Analyzing the works in terms of whether an objective observer would
view the dissimilarities as creating a separate aesthetic appeal grants the
court the flexibility to measure the differences in light of the options
available to the artist. The finder of fact may consider whether the subject
matter of a work is of the type which limits the ability of the artist to create
a different effect. If so, subtler disparities might be sufficient to distinguish
the work. On the other hand, if the subject is fanciful in nature, an
objective observer would seem likely to demand a higher degree of
demarcation in perspective or technique to view the second as a separate
artistic effort.'32 After all, the artist is not restrained by conventional
limitations in depicting fanciful subjects. As a result, the more unique the
subject matter, the stronger the changes would have to be to create a non-
infringing work.
128. It must be noted that a change in the positioning of the clothing must be in a sufficient
form to alter the work's aesthetic appeal. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Scoreboard
Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979) (the unbuttoning of the women's halter tops in the
second poster did not avoid infringement where the women stood in an identical pose with
identical uniforms); Esquire, Inc. v. Varga Enters., 81 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Ill. 1948) (differences
in clothing were "not decisive").
129. 212 F. 930 (2d Cir. 1914).
130. Changing the actual pose of the model could be sufficient. See Gross v. Van Dyk
Gravure Co., 230 F. 412 (2d Cir. 1916). The fact that the model's head tilted toward her knees
was the only difference between "Grace of Youth" and "At Ease." However, the court found the
difference sufficient so that both works were copyrightable. Id. at 413.
131. Gross, 212 F. at 931. See also Gentieu v. John Muller & Co., 712 F. Supp. 740 (W.D.
Mo. 1989) (limiting protection in the picture of "floating naked babies" to an identical copy).
132. Cf. Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., 575 F.2d 62, 65-66 (3d Cir.
1978).
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2. Artist's Choice of Medium and Style
The medium in which an artist chooses to work may also have
implications for the degree of protection a copyrighted work will re-
ceive. 3 3 In general, works created with paint and canvas will probably
receive more protection than those created with lens and film.
A photograph is inevitably a more precise record of its subject
than is a painting; thus it is far more difficult for a photogra-
pher to avoid "copying" an earlier work of his when shooting
the identical subject in a similar setting than it is for a painter
to do so when painting the identical subject in a similar
setting.'
Even applying the test this article proposes, it is possible for a painter to
portray the identical scene from the same angle without infringing a past
work which may not be possible through film.
35
Even among painters, the style an artist uses to portray a work may
also affect the ability to return to a theme. A lay observer will be able to
distinquish between reality and the subjective effect of an artist's work
more readily if the artist paints in an impressionistic style rather than with
photographic clarity. 36  Other modem styles may even achieve greater
subjectivity. 37  For instance, a Parisian artist spoke of one post-impres-
sionist:
Gauguin freed us from all the restraints which the idea of
copying nature had placed upon us. For instance, if it was
permissible to use vermilion in painting a tree which seemed
reddish ... why not stress even to the point of deformation
the curve of a beautiful shoulder or conventionalize the
symmetry of a bough. . . 13
133. Id. at 65.
134. ALAN LATMAN ET. AL, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 431 (1989).
135. Id.
136. Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., 575 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1978).
One commentator defines style as "the particular way in which the forms that make up any given
work of art are chosen and fitted together." Michelle Brownlee, Safeguarding Style: What
Protection Is Afforded To Visual Artists By The Copyright And Trademark Laws?, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1157 (1993).
137. For instance, Paul Cdzanne said of Monet, "He is only an eye, but what an eye!"
MYERS, supra note 75, at 94. Renoir also told an influential art dealer in 1883, "1 had wrung
Impressionism dry, and I finally came to the conclusion that I knew neither how to paint nor how
to draw. In a word, Impressionism was a blind alley, as far as I was concerned... ." DE LA
CROIX, supra note 78, at 864.
138. DE LA CROIX, supra note 78, at 869.
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As a style of painting becomes more fanciful in its portrayal of a subject,
the artist must introduce larger differences between the depictions to avoid
infringement since the artist has a greater variety of options to choose from
in producing the second work.
Although some artists may be prohibited from experimenting with a
subject more than others because of the style they employ, this result seems
almost inevitable. Fostering experimentation to advance an art form
challenges artists to break the bounds of convention. That endeavor
naturally encourages artists to invest more subjective personality traits into
their work. The proposed test may alleviate some of this prejudice, but to
a certain extent the disparity is the inevitable cost which the artist must pay
for choosing a style which allows for less creativity.
IlI. MUSICAL WORKS
While visual artists often deliberately use past subjects as a source
for new works, composers of musical compositions may unintentionally
write a piece which sounds similar to a work they composed in the
past. 39 The composer may be accused of infringing upon the past efforts
if the composer no longer owns rights in the work.t " This section
investigates the concerns involved in permitting musical composers to write
in their own style, and advocates a test which focuses on the dissimilarities
between works as the standard for determining infringement.
A. Infringement of a Prior Composition
Musical works created by the same composer are more likely to
sound alike than those created by someone else since song writers often
employ the same conventions and blend of styles throughout their
works.' 4 ' As one musician proclaimed, "How can you not sound like
139. See Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1532 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 113 S.
Ct. 2992 (1993). See also ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir.
1983); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
140. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 664 F. Supp. 1345 (N.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd 984 F.2d 1524 (9th
Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993).
141. See Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1992);
Warner Bros. Pictures v. CBS, 216 F.2d 945, 950, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1954); Jeweler's
Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 274 F. 932, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); Steams, supra note
67, at 543-44.
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yourself?' 142  A musical composition which sounds similar to a prior
work is more likely to be the result of a musician's tendency to invoke the
same types of rhythms, harmonies, tempos, and tone colors than any
conscious attempt to appropriate the value of a past work.
43
A jury recently acquitted John Fogerty, a contemporary composer
and recording artist, of infringing "Run Through the Jungle," a song he had
written in 1970 as a member of the band Creedence Clearwater Reviv-
al.'" Fantasy, the record company that owned rights in the work,
claimed that Fogerty's new song "Old Man Down the Road" was merely
"Run Through the Jungle" with new words.14  Fogerty argued to the jury
142. Harriet Chiang, Fogerty Cleared Of Stealing Own Song, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 8, 1988, at
Al. Fogerty claimed, "The ramifications would have been horrendous. I could see John Lennon,
Shakespeare, Bob Dylan, and even Springsteen saying, 'Wait a minute, John. Don't blow this.'
How can you not sound like yourself?" Id.
Fogerty testified at trial about his composing style. "I fiddle with the guitar until I come
up with something that seems keepable." Harriet Chiang, John Fogerty Sings His Head Off On
Witness Stand, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 1, 1988, at A2. Fogerty described his style to the jury, "I call
it swamp music .... [b]ut it is by no means recognized by the Julliard School of Music-most
rock fans know what I mean." Joel Selvin, Fantasy Records Suit John Fogerty's Run Through
The Legal Jungle, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 30, 1988, Sun. Datebook, at 49.
while Fogerty is from Berkeley, California, his music has a distinctive "southern, delta
roots sound." Discussing the imagery of"Proud Mary," his most successful song, he commented,
I could have put it on the Sacramento River, but I loved the sound of all
those Southern places... New Orleans, Memphis,.... [s]o, "Proud Mary" had
to be on the Mississippi River.
I started doing that with other songs. I'd put my own experiences in that
special setting. In "Born on the Bayou," for instance, I just described my own
childhood. I had a dog, I went to picnics on the Fourth of July. I didn't run
through the backwoods bare, but I did with swimming trunks. I just threw in a
little voodoo images to create this special little world and it stuck.
Robert Hilburn, Fogerty's Nightmare Is Over, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1985, at F54.
143. "The principal tools for originality in musical composition are rhythm, melody and
harmony. Each affects a different sensibility in the listener." 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, § 8.3,
at 83.
144. Harriet Chiang, Fogerty Cleared of Stealing Own Song, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 8, 1988, at
Al. The jury took less than three hours to reach unanimous verdict. After the verdict was
announced Fogerty shook hands and signed autographs for members of the jury. The plaintiff's
attorney claimed "We were upstaged by a superstar." One must consider the extent to which
Fogerty's celebrity status aided his prevailing at trial. However, the jury foreman remarked,
"'There may have been similarities, but there were not substantial similarities."' Id.
Fogerty responded by filing suit for more than $400,000 in attorney's fees claiming that
the litigation was brought in bad faith. Id. See Fantasy, 984 F.2d 1524.
145. Fantasy, 984 F.2d at 1524. Before the case went to trial, the district court denied the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment maintaining that "reasonable minds could differ as to
the absence or existence of substantial similarity between Jungle and Old Man." Fantasy, 664
F. Supp. 1345, 1350 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
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that the similarities between the two songs were part of his composing
style.'4 "At stake is whether a person can continue to use his own style,
or is he to be prevented from ever sounding like himself again.""
Particularly in popular genres, musicians strive to achieve their own
distinct sound.'48 The drive to realize a unique and identifiable style of
songwriting can lead to increased vulnerability to self-infringement claims
as well as the expected financial and artistic rewards. The problem is
particularly acute in the context of musical works.' 49 "Aesthetic conven-
tion and the limits of the human ear impose substantial constraints on
invention and variety in musical composition.... In popular music....
convention imposes particularly stringent limits on invention. Popular
music will usually follow in the well-worn grooves of its particular
genre."'
150
The small margin for error in applying infringement tests to musical
works intensifies when a composer is accused of infringing the copyright
in a piece he invented.' Composers naturally tend to employ similar
harmonies, keys, time signatures, and scalular modes in creating individual
works.'52
146. John Voland, Morning Report: Pop & Rock, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1988, at F2. The
district court would not allow Fogerty to make a First Amendment defense that Fogerty's
songwriting style was constitutionally protected finding that "[t]he 'idea/expression' dichotomy
serves to accommodate any 1st [sic] Amendment concerns expressed by defendants." 664 F.
Supp. 1345, 1351 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
147. Larry Olmstead, Can You Plagiarize Yourself?, DEa. FREE PREss, Nov. 5, 1988, at 12C.
148. See id.
149. "Musical compositions pose distinctively difficult problems for copyright infringement
determinations. The core of the difficulty is that the vocabulary available for musical composition
is far less rich and enables far less invention than the vocabulary of literature, drama and the
visual arts." 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, § 8.3, at 82.
150. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, § 8.3, at 85. See also Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co.,
113 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940) ("[W]hile there are an enormous number of possible permutations of
the musical note of the scale, only a few are pleasing .... Recurrence is not therefore an
inevitable badge of plagiarism.").
151. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, § 8.3.1, at 87.
152. Consistency among those elements contributes to the recognizability of a musician's
style. For example, discussing his new "Eye of the Zombie" album, Fogerty commented, "[lit
had to be different from my other albums, especially 'Centerfield.' That doesn't mean you won't
find bits and pieces that sound like Creedence. That music is indigenous to me. There's no way
I can escape that sound." Robert Hilburn, The Fogerty RevivaL Part 11, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14,
1986, at F64.
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B. Proposed Test for Determining Infringement
1. Standard Infringement Tests
In order to show infringement, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant copied the plaintiff's work and that the copying "went so far as
to constitute improper appropriation."' 53 Copying may be demonstrated
through direct evidence or by showing access and substantial similarity
between the works." Expert testimony is admissible in order to ascer-
tain whether the similarities between the works are probative of copy-
ing.' In order to decide whether there was improper appropriation,
courts generally determine protectible subject matter by dissecting the
melody, rhythm and accompaniment of the works." 6 After separating the
unprotectable elements, the finder of fact must apply the "audience
test'' 7 to determine "whether defendants took from plaintiff's work so
much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the
audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant
wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff."'5 8
153. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
154. In cases involving infringement of musical works, most courts require the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant had some form of access to the defendant's work in order to prove
copying. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, § 8.3.1, at 87. See, e.g., Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7th
Cir. 1984). Absent proof of access, "the similarities must be so striking as to preclude the
possibility that the defendant independently arrived at the same result." I& at 903. The Ninth
Circuit applies the "Inverse Ratio Rule" where "a very high degree of similarity is required in
order to dispense with proof of access, it must logically follow that where proof of access is
offered, the required degree of similarity may be somewhat less than would be necessary in the
absence of such proof." Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting 2
NBIMER, supra note 9, § 143.4, at 634).
155. See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983).
156. 2 GOLDSTErIN, supra note 14, § 8.3.2, at 93-95. Courts often focus on whether the
musical phrase is original or whether it is "so elemental that the court will deny protection on the
ground that, to give plaintiff a monopoly over so simple a phrase would improperly curb musical
composition generally." Id. at 93.
157. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
158. Amstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). The Ninth Circuit test for improper
appropriation of a musical composition also involves dissection and the reaction of the lay
audience.
It appears that the Ninth Circuit's "subjective test" is essentially what other circuits refer
to as the "audience test." The Ninth Circuit divides improper appropriation into a test for
objective, extrinsic similarity, in which expert testimony is appropriate, and a subjective, intrinsic
evaluation, equivalent to what other circuits refer to as the audience test. Chiate v. Morris, 972
F.2d 1337, n.4, 1992 WL 197591, at **7 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished disposition). The Ninth
Circuit's version of improper appropriation now seems to be roughly equivalent to other circuits,
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Application of the standard approach becomes problematic when
common authorship is involved. Expert testimony relying on computer
analysis is ill-suited to meet the special concerns involved with musicians,
who naturally tend to compose in their own personal style. The type of
analysis which merely plots the intervals of the notes on a computer drawn
chart concentrates on patterns within the works that may simply relate to
the composer's writing style. 59 Even if a jury vindicates the defendant
by applying the audience test, the songwriter must face years of litigation
and substantial legal fees in an action he may not to wish to settle. 6
Copyright law should formulate an infringement test which allows
songwriters to work in their own style, without fear of judicial intervention.
since either way, the finder of fact is privy to expert testimony pertaining to the similarities
between the works but ultimately decides the matter by listening to the actual song and trusting
their ears.
Chiate applied the Ninth Circuit's revised test in Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th
Cir. 1990) (involving infringement of a television script), without specifying the exact standard
of the subjective test in the context of musical works. Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421 (9th
Cir. 1987), contained a clearer statement of how the intrinsic and extrinsic tests of Sid & Marty
Kroffi applied to musical works before Shaw revised the circuit's standard of infringement.
Baxter declares that the intrinsic test, now the subjective test, is determined by "the response of
the ordinary reasonable person to the works. 'Analytic dissection' and expert testimony are not
called for .. " 812 F.2d 421, 424 (1987).
159. In John Fogerty's case, he testified at his own trial for two days on the witness stand
with his guitar. Fogerty explained how the works were distinct compositions.
"Run Through the Jungle"is syncopated.... It's not happening on the beat...
In "Old Man Down the Road," each note falls on the beat. ... The idea in
blues is that you can take those unique notes and use them in different ways.
I don't think Beethoven used these blues notes in a bluesy way.... That's the
difference between Bo Diddley and Beethoven.
Harriet Chiang, S.F. Trial John Fogerty Notes Fine Distinctions, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 2, 1988, at
A7. Fogerty also called a musicologist to testify on his behalf. However, attorneys for Fantasy
used computer generated comparisons of the melody, bass line and harmony for each of the songs.
Leslie Guevarra, Expert Says Rocker's Songs Do Differ, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 29, 1988, at A2. In
the end, however, both sides empowered the jury to "trust your own ears." Play It By Ear,
Attorneys Tell Fogerty Jurors, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 5, 1988, at A3.
160. Even though Fogerty ultimately prevailed at trial, he suffered through three years of
litigation, spent $400,000 in attorney's fees defending the case and even broke his hand punching
a chair in frustration. Larry Olmstead, DET. FREE PRESs, Nov. 5, 1988, at 12C; Harriet Chiang,
Fogerty Cleared Of Stealing Own Song, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 8, 1988, at Al.
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2. Proposed Infringement Test
Similarities between songs composed by the same musician are no
more indicative of copying than similarities between visual works created
by the same artist. If the song was the result of independent creation, then
the second work is not an infringement.'6 ' Although the Fantasy Court
allowed the parties to present expert testimony, 62 the practice may tend
to confuse the jury since the testimony focuses on objective criteria such
as note structure without recognizing that the songs may sound alike simply
because they were created by the same person regardless of whether they
were copied. However, the songwriter should still be able to testify as to
the manner in which the song was composed in order to determine whether
it was independently created.
If copying is established, the court should separate protectible and
non-protectible subject matter as the first step in determining that the
copying was improper appropriation. Concentrating on the melody and
other central aspects of the piece allows the court to remove some of the
elements such as preference for certain harmonies, instrument selections or
tone colors that may make the work sound similar merely because of the
inherent tendencies of the artist in developing a style.' 63  Because
characterizing protectible expression is essentially a legal inquiry, the court
need not allow expert testimony on the issue."
The second step of the proposed standard for improper appropriation
is a variation of the audience test equivalent to that suggested for visual
works. The determination should focus on whether an objective observer
hearing both compositions would determine that the second work contains
enough dissimilarities to create a different aesthetic effect. The composi-
tion must contain enough qualitative differences to allow a lay audience to
perceive the second song as a distinct artistic effort in order to avoid
infringement. By focusing on the disparities between the songs, the fimder
of fact will be less likely to consider the inherent personality traits of the
composer embodied in both works while determining infringement.1
65
161. 2 NImmER, supra note 9, § 8.01[C], at 8-20.
162. 664 F. Supp. 1343. See Leslie Guevarra, Expert Says Rocker's Songs Do Differ, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 29, 1988, at A2.
163. See 2 GO.DSTEIN, supra note 14, § 8.3.2.1, at 93-94.
164. See, e.g., Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (determining
whether the accompaniment was protectible as a legal matter without the aid of expert testimony).
165. See Alt v. Morello, 227 U.S.P.Q. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also supra notes 25-28 and
accompanying text.
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IV. CHARACTERS IN LITERARY WORKS
Literary characters developed over the course of several narratives
bring a sense of depth and continuity to a story. Writers commonly use
characters from one novel in a series of subsequent works.' 6  Disputes
arise when the author sells the copyright in a story to a publisher or film
producer who then claims that the author has also abandoned all his rights
in the characters which shaped the plot. 67 This article argues that parties
who wish to divest an author of rights in characters of the author's
invention should face a presumption that those rights were not transferred
with the copyright, unless the document clearly indicates that the author
intended to relinquish his right to create sequels.
A. Recognition of Protection for Literary Characters
Literary characters consist of at least two ingredients: a name and
a set of physical and personality traits.'68 An author paints the image of
the character in the mind of the reader through descriptions, action and
dialogue 69 Because literary characters consist of a series or combination
of abstractions, courts have been reluctant to grant copyright protection in
them unless the characters have been fully developed to a point where they
represent more than an amorphous idea. Judge Learned Hand articulated
the generally accepted guidelines for protection in Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp.:170
If Twelfth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible that a
second comer might so closely imitate Sir Toby Belch or
166. See Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 1970)
(Waterman, J., concurring in part).
167. Trust Company Bank v. MGM/UA Entertainment Co., 593 F. Supp. 580 (N.D. Ga.
1984), aft'd, 772 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1984); Warner Bros. Pictures v. CBS, 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1954); Gillete v. Stoll Film Co., 200 N.Y.S. 787 (1922). See also
Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982).
168. E. Fulton Brylawski, Protection Of Characters-Sam Spade Revisited, 22 COPY. BULL
77 (1975).
169. Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives Of Fictional Characters, 1986 Wis. L.
REv. 429, 451. Literary characters receive less protection than pictorial or cartoon characters
because they are less concrete. Unlike pictorial characters, literary characters provide nothing
with which to make a side-by-side physical comparison. Id. See, e.g., Detective Comics, Inc. v.
Bruns Publications, Inc., 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940) (granting copyright protection to
"Superman").
170. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
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Malvolio as to infringe, but it would not be enough that for
one of his characters he cast a riotous knight who kept wassail
to the discomfort of the household, or a vain and foppish
steward who became amorous of his mistress. These would
be no more than Shakespeare's "ideas" in the play, as little
capable of monopoly as Einstein's Doctrine of Relativity, or
Darwin's theory of the Origin of Species. It follows that the
less developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted;
that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too
indistinctly.'
Thus, the standard set forth in Nichols recognizes that a character can be
copyrighted "quite independently of the 'plot,"". 72 but only if its personal-
ity has been fully defined.7 3
B. Authors Who Created the Character
An author typically must sell the copyright in a short story or novel
in order to exploit the incentive system and reap the benefits of his labor.
Rarely, however, does the writer suspect that in selling the work he may
also be parting with his right to control the development of his characters
or to generate sequels. 74 While strong policy concerns may compel
courts to protect against the unrestrained pilfering of characters by other
writers, these concerns hold significantly less strength when another party
seeks to divest an author of rights in characters the author invented.
Authors such as Shakespeare who succeed in creating numerous
interesting and memorable characters are rare indeed. Writers who invent
171. Id. at 121.
172. Id.
173. One commentator notes:
Fully realized characters in literature are little different from fully defined personalities
in daily life, and it is no surprise that the test of protectibility that courts apply to literary
characters is closely akin to the criterion that individuals apply in daily life to determine
whether they in truth know someone.
I GOLDSTEiN, supra note 14, § 2.7.2, at 128.
Literary characters have been recognized as capable of copyright protection in a number
of cases. See Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989); Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982); Stallone v. Anderson, 1989 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH)
26,427 at 22,665 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 509 F. Supp. 60
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 668 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981).
174. Trust Company Bank v. MGMIUA Entertainment Co., 593 F. Supp. 580 (N.D. Ga.
1984), aff'd, 772 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1984); Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d
397, 406 (2d Cir. 1970) (Waterman, J., concurring).
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only a handful of notable characters during their entire literary careers are
far more typical."' "The characters of an author's imagination and the
art of his descriptive talent, like a painter's or like a person with his
penmanship, are always limited and always fall into limited patterns.' 76
There are only so many unique characters one author can invent. As a
result, copyright law should be especially cautious not to seize the only
vehicle an author has to continue the story.
In addition, writers often take great personal interest in the develop-
ment of their characters. For example, Margaret Mitchell Marsh, author of
Gone with the Wind, refused to sell the rights in her characters to the movie
industry so that they could make a sequel. A letter written by her husband
to MGM in 1940 stated:
You may be certain that we will take steps to prevent any sale
or use of this purported sequel, for Mrs. Marsh does not
intend to have her sequel rights infringed upon in any way.
Of course, the rights are worth a lot of money to her, but,
beyond that, she feels a personal interest in Scarlet, Rhett, and
the other characters she created and she would fight to defend
them from misuse and abuse by some other writer. 77
The power to choose not to develop a story any further can be very
important to an author. As with Gone With The Wind, a writer may decide
that a story has reached its end and was meant to go no further. 78 The
right to control how a character is used may be a significant part of the
incentive system. If a writer does decide that a sequel is appropriate, the
quality and integrity of the subsequent work is likely to be much greater
175. For instance, even writers such as F. Scott Fitzgerald and Ernest Hemingway may have
had an incredible gift for the descriptive art, but were successful in creating only a few characters
that are memorable in and of themselves apart from the story line.
176. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. CBS, 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954).
He must be a poor creature that does not often repeat himself. Imagine the
author of the excellent piece of advice, "Know Thyself', never alluding to that
sentiment again during the course of a protracted existence! Why, the truths a
man carries about with him are his tools; and do you think a carpenter is bound
to use the same plane but once to smooth a knotty board with, or to hang up his
hammer after it has driven its first nail?
Id. at 950 n.5 (quoting OLIVER W. HOLMES, M.D., THE AuTOCRAT OF THE BREAKFAST TABLE
9 (1858)).
177. Trust Company Bank v. MGMIUA Entertainment Co., 593 F. Supp. 580,583 (N.D. Ga.
1984).
178. Unfortunately, her wishes were short lived since her heirs proceeded to sell her sequel
rights after her death. L Were she alive today, Mitchell might say that Scarlet and Rhett have
since been "abused and misused by some other writer' in a new novel. See ALEXANDRA RIPLEY,
ScARLETT: THE SEQUEL TO MARGARET MITCHELL'S GoNE wITH THE WIND (1991).
PROTECTING ARTISTIC FREEDOM
than if "some other writer ' 79 continues the narration. No one knows a
character as well as the person who guided the pen which brought it to life.
In order to inspire high quality sequels, contracts which are silent as
to the transfer of rights in characters should be construed against the buyer
of the copyright. The Ninth Circuit took this approach in Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc. v. CBS. 180  In that case, Dashiell Hammett wrote The
Maltese Falcon, a mystery novel centered around a detective named Sam
Spade. Hammett sold Warner Brothers radio and television rights to the
The Maltese Falcon and then used Sam Spade and other characters in new
stories which he sold to CBS. Warner Brothers claimed that they had the
exclusive right to use Hammett's characters in motion picture, television
and radio. The court held that if a contract is silent, the court will presume
that the parties did not intend to transfer the rights in the characters.' 8 '
In recognition of the unequal bargaining power between authors and
publishers, the law should require the buyer of the copyrighted work to
meet a higher burden of proof in order to divest an author of rights in
characters he invented. 2 Because an unrepresented author faced with a
lengthy standard form contract may be subject to significant overreaching
by large production companies, the publisher should face a rebuttable
presumption that the parties did not intend to transfer the rights to the
characters in the transaction.'83  The publisher could only rebut the
presumption by clear and convincing evidence of the intent of the parties
within the document itself. For example, in a lengthy standard form
contract that was not the subject of negotiation by the parties, the publisher
would be required to spell out the exact nature of the rights the author is
179. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
180. 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954).
181. L at 949. See also Trust Company Bank v. MGM/UA Entertainment Co., 593 F. Supp.
580 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
182. Cf. Michael V.P. Marks, Legal Rights Of Fictional Characters, 25 COPYRiGHT L. SYMP.
(ASCAP) 35, 44 (1975) ([he court could have invoked the principle that a plaintiff seeking to
prove it has acquired exclusive rights in literary property has a more difficult burden to meet
where it is seeking to assert such rights against an author or his assigns than where the rights are
asserted against a "stranger."); Gilette v. Stoll Film Co, 200 N.Y.S. 787, 789 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1922); O'Neill v. General Film Co., 157 N.Y.S. 1028, 1036 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916) (more
evidence is required to establish a prima facie case of adverse possession of literary property
rights against the author or his assigns).
183. Although Margaret Mitchell Marsh was well represented in her contract negotiations,
many writers may not be so fortunate. Even despite clear wording that sequel rights would
remain with Marsh in the contract, MGM still brought suit against her assigns to halt any deals
on a sequel to Gone With The Wind. Trust Company Bank v. MGM/UA Entertainment Co., 593
F. Supp. 580 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
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giving away and that part of the contract would need to be signed
separately."u The exclusive right to generate sequels can be an important
bargaining chip for an author.'85 Since few authors know the full value
of their work prior to publication, a strong presumption against depriving
writers of sequel rights provides a mechanism to equalize the bargaining
power of the parties.
8 6
In Warner Bros., the Ninth Circuit may have in fact gone a step
further to protect an author's right to make sequels with characters he
invented. The court stated that even if Dashiell Hammett assigned
complete rights in The Maltese Falcon to Warner Brothers, including
exclusive rights in the character Sam Spade, Hammett was not precluded
from using the character again because he was only a vehicle for telling the
story and not the story being told.' While courts and commentators
have read this statement as proposing a very restrictive test for recognizing
copyright protection of characters in general, considering the context of the
opinion, the court may have actually been advancing a test solely for
determining whether an author who created the characters could be
precluded from using them again. This reading would go far toward
unraveling the court's notorious statement: "It is conceivable that the
character really constitutes the story being told, but if the character is only
the chessman in the game of telling the story he is not within the area of
the protection afforded by the copyright."'
188
184. The following language, in large print, would suffice if the author had also signed the
document near the clause:
The author acknowledges that this agreement transfers all rights the author
possesses in the characters within this work. The author recognizes that he or
she gives up all rights to create sequels or use the characters in any other way
without the express consent of the buyer.
"The clearest language is necessary to divest the author of the fruits of his labor." Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc. v. CBS, 216 F.2d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 1954).
185. Trust Company Bank, 593 F. Supp. at 584.
186. This mechanism is similar to the renewal period under the old act where after 28 years
from publication the original creator had the right to renew the copyright irrespective of who
owned the copyright at the time. See 17 U.S.C. § 28 (1909); see also Fred Fisher Music Co. v.
M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
Even if an author is held to have transferred all rights in his characters, if the buyer
accuses the author of infringement for creating another character with some similar attributes, the
test proposed for infringement of visual and musical works may be appropriate. The trier of fact
could focus on the dissimilarities between the characters to determine if a persona with a distinct
appeal has been created. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
187. Warner Bros., 216 F.2d at 950. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
188. Warner Bros., 216 F.2d at 950.
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by too many business types."'9
192. RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENIcoLA, CASES ON CoPYRIGHT248 (5th ed. 1990).
PROTECTING ARTISTIC FREEDOM
Instead of formulating a rule for recognizing copyright protection in
a character, the court was declaring that exclusive rights to the use of
characters can only be transferred from the author if they constitute the
story itself.'89 If a character is the story, it would not be possible for the
author to create a sequel without infringing the work. However, if the
characters are only vehicles for telling the story, as a matter of policy they
cannot be transferred away.' The court ruled that the copyright statute
does not allow authors to transfer all of their rights in characters because
the copyright's purpose in promoting authorship may be stifled if writers
were not allowed to return to characters they invented. 9' In any event,
a court should be reluctant to divest an author's rights in characters he
invented absent clear and convincing evidence of the parties' intent.
V. CONCLUSION
Art, music, and literature flow from finite sources. The law must be
cautious not to bind an artist's hands by granting copyright owners broad
power to control an artist's subsequent creations. Rather, copyright law
should draw a distinction between authors who created the original work
and those who did not in order to insure that fear of infringement does not
extinguish the spirit of creation. As a juror in the Fantasy trial proclaimed,
"Creative people have got to have rights to create without being harassed
189. The court stated:
We conclude that even if the Owners assigned their complete rights in the
copyright to the Falcon, such assignment did not prevent the author from using
the characters use therein, in other stories. The characters were vehicles for the
story told, and the vehicles did not go with the sale of the story.
Id. See Kurtz, supra note 169, at 453.
190. See supra notes 149-58 and accompanying text for discussion of the policy implications.
191. The opinion investigates the problem solely from the standpoint of an author being
precluded from using characters he created, rather than in terms of copyright protection in general.
If the opinion is read in this context, the standard the court proposes makes much more sense.
The practice of writers to compose sequels to stories is old, and the copyright
statute, though amended several times, has never specifically mentioned the point
If Congress had intended that the sale of the right to publish a copyrighted
story would foreclose the author's use of its characters in subsequent works for
the life of the copyright, it would seem Congress would have made specific
provision therefor.... The restriction argued for is unreasonable, and would
effect the very opposite of the statute's purpose which is to encourage the
production of the arts.
Warner Bros., 216 F.2d at 950 (citation omitted).
